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От редакции: Одна из последних книг В. Буковского  EUSSR написанная в соавторстве с Павлом Строловым и издана в 2006 году в Италии. Эта книга ещё не издавалась на русском языке, но вы можете ознакомиться с ней на русском и английском языке  (англоязычная версия)

Публикацию подготовил Рустэм Сакс (admin@bukovsky.org)

Vladimir Bukovsky

Pavel Strolov

EUSSR

Introduction

For anyone even remotely familiar with the Soviet system, its similarity with the developing structures of the European Union (EU), with its governing philosophy and "Democratic deficit", its endemic corruption and bureaucratic ineptitude is striking.  For anyone who lived under the Soviet tyranny or its equivalents across the world - it is frightening. Once again we observe with growing horror the emergence of a Leviathan which we had hoped was dead and buried, a monster which destroyed scores of nations, impoverished millions and devastated several generations before finally collapsing.  Is it inevitable?  Is the human race bent on self-destruction and doomed to repeat the same mistake time and again until it dies in misery?  Or, is the EU, indeed, simply a clone of the USSR imposed upon reluctant nations of Europe by the same political forces which created the first one?

The answer to these questions can be found in the secret archives of the Politburo in Moscow which the authors were lucky to get access to.  We refer those who want to see the originals to the archives of the Gorbachev Foundation (Inventories 1-1; 2-2; 2-3 and 3-1).

Vladimir Bukovsky

Pavel Strolov

December, 2004

1. Fateful decision.

There are some days in history when the destiny of whole continents is pre-determined for many decades to come.  One would not find these dates in an encyclopaedia, neither would students spend sleepless nights before exams memorising them.  Only the few, the chosen, know and honour those dates.

As for us, the unchosen masses, we go to sleep one night in a familiar environment of our ancient homeland, and the next morning we wake up in a desolation of some union of socialist republics. We are not supposed even to know who has taken that fatal decision and when.

For Europe, one of such dates was March 26^th in the year 1987.

That day, the Soviet Politburo made a decision on the USSR's future policy in Western Europe.  Gorbachev formulated the gist of this policy briefly and clearly, like a battle order:

To strangle in embrace.

This concept already had a specific name among the inner circle of the Soviet leadership – ''Common European Home''.  Soon it became known to the whole world.

At that Politburo meeting ''Common European Home'' was given the highest priority.  Gorbachev strictly prohibited the making of any political decisions without taking it into account.

Many things, comrades, are involved here. Obviously, we should not make a decision on any issue without taking Europe into account. We need it even in our internal affairs, for perestroika. But in foreign policy Europe is irreplaceable. It means the strongest bourgeoisie in the world, not only economically, but politically as well.

Look, it seemed that Japan had outraced the whole world, and suddenly West Germany made such a dash in the sphere of science and technology!

Meanwhile, it was exactly in that sphere where Soviet backwardness had become catastrophic by that time.  Indeed, Gorbachev decided to embrace Europe not because of sincere brotherly love.  He had no choice.

By the beginning of the 1980s, the Soviet leadership had finally waken up to the fact that their system had entered a period of profound structural crisis.  On the one hand, their economic model, unproductive and wasteful by definition like all socialist models, had brought them to the brink of bankruptcy.  On the other, their very ‘success’ in exporting that model to other countries was becoming an unbearable burden to carry on their shoulders.  With their troops bogged down in Afghanistan, and with the Polish crisis looming large on their doorstep, the ‘cost of Empire’ became virtually unsustainable.  Simply put, they had suddenly realised that their economic base was too small for their global ambitions.  Added to that a new round of the arms race forced on them by Ronald Reagan, falling oil prices and a growing discontent at home, and one could understand their sudden urge for reforms.  A final blow came with Reagan's obsession with the ‘Star Wars’ project.  Americans might have been bluffing, but the Soviets had to follow suit regardless, trying to compete in the very sphere where they were most behind the West - hi-tech.

The only way to modernize the Soviet economy was to use the ‘class enemy's’ technological potential.

An important task is to use Western Europe's scientific and technological potential.  All the more so since our Eastern European friends have already struck there.  Our rapprochement with Western Europe would make their work easier.

Gorbachev's idea was clear enough. On one hand, he feared the growing economic dependence of the Soviet satellites on the West. So, he hoped his friendship with Europe would secure the Western borders of his empire. On the other hand, once the other communist regimes in Europe were already fraternizing with the West, he felt it necessary to strengthen their embraces with the strangling grasp of the Soviet Union.  Once these regimes were dealing with the class enemy anyway, they should do so in complete unity.

Besides, the Politburo had to take care not only of the Eastern bloc, but also of the whole world. They came to the conclusion that ‘Common European Home’ was a key to success of their worldwide plans.

Europe is present everywhere: in Cambodia, in the Middle East, in Africa, and, of course, among our Eastern [bloc] friends, and even in Latin America.  Without Europe, we are unable actually to move forward anywhere.

If Western Sovietologists, by some miracle, knew about these ''prospective measures of the USSR's foreign policy at the Western European direction", they would call it ‘finlandisation’.  Indeed, Gorbachev mentioned the Soviet experience of relations with Finland, and with Austria as well, as a good example of ''constructing new international relations''. Now he planned to expand them to continental scale.

However, Finland and Austria were just small neutral countries, while NATO kept preventing finlandisation of the whole of Europe.  Hence, the first particular objective followed:

Not to split Western Europe from the USA, but rather to oust the USA out of Europe.

Later, Gorbachev often insisted that the ''common European home'' project never had been intended to cause a split between Europe and the USA.  He lied.

But, indeed, there is some difference between splitting and ousting. A split among enemies, good as it is, does not mean the parties become more hostile to each other than to you.  The Soviet tactic of gradually ousting the USA by strengthening their own influence is different.  This ousting, in turn, created additional opportunities to increase the Soviet influence, whose goal is to oust the USA ever further.  Thus it goes until the final victory, when the Kremlin would be awarded with absolutely pro-Soviet, ''finlandised'' Europe and with the isolation of the United States in their own continent.

Shall we succeed?  I don't know.  But we cannot shirk from setting this goal.  Europe is our problem.  Our interests are great there.  And we should not fear.

Gorbachev also emphasised two ‘realities’ to be seen, analysed and used.  The first one was the ‘diversity’ of Europe.  The Soviets had to work out the most suitable approaches to every country, to every political party, to various circles of various societies.

The other ‘reality’ was European integration.  It was necessary to analyse, Gorbachev said, which aspects of this integration were good for the Soviets and which were not.
 

2.  Crisis of Socialism. 

Before the mid-80s, Soviet leaders and most of the Western Left were hostile towards the European Communities and the Common Market, seeing them as a result of a conspiracy between multinational corporations and liberal politicians. 

It was the world-wide crisis of socialism in late 1970s – early 1980s which made them start re-considering this attitude, as well as many other cornerstones of their strategies. 

The Italian Communist Party used to be seen by the Soviets as disloyal, if not hostile, because of its ‘euro-communist’ direction.  Now this had to be re-viewed, too.  More than that, Italian communists played quite an important role in working out the new strategy.

Their leaders, such as Alessandro Natta, Akille Okketto or Giorgio Napolitano, were frequent guests in Gorbachev's Moscow. Their discussions with the Soviets were duly minuted, but then hidden in the utter darkness of top secrecy.  

The leaders of Italian proletariat were seriously worried: 

A. Natta. […] Since the late '70s, not only the offensive of capitalism can be seen in the West, but also certain successes of this offensive in economic, political and ideological respects (the ideas of market and competition are getting ever stronger roots).

At the next meeting, Natta developed his point further:

It seems that the most dangerous thing in the conservative forces' growing influence is not their electoral success, nor even their victories over trade unions, but their advance in the sphere of cultural and ideological influence. […] The followers of conservative ideas have even infiltrated historiography. Today, we can hear not only the voices of those who believe that the Communist Revolution in Russia was wrong, but even of those who deny the legitimacy of the French Bourgeois Revolution. Of course, these new cultural trends are unpleasant, but we cannot ignore them.  

When the ICP General Secretary shifted his look from the advancing enemy to the ranks of the proletariat, his mood became even gloomier:

The response of the working class, of all the left-wing forces, to imperialism's attack is inadequate.  To be frank, the communist parties in the West in crisis.  It was not like this 15-20 years ago.  There is a retreat, a loss of influence in the masses, and not only at the polls.  The splits and deep crises in the parties has influenced the working class's position.  And the reasons for this are not only in late reactions to imperialism's attacks, late evaluation of the new situation, but something else, too.

And the communists are not alone in this distressful situation, Natta continued. Rather, we are facing a common crisis of all the European Left.

We live in Europe, in Western Europe. We were born here, and we are fighting for socialism in Western Europe. German social democrats, British Labourites, French communists have also met big problems, arising from scientific and technological progress, collapse of the 'welfare state' and unemployment.  The social democrats have followed their traditional policy, but now they are beginning to ponder, too.  However, the problems we've met are not only European.  They exist in other parts of the world, as well.

The latest failure of the European Left had been, at that time, Mitterrand's attempt (in coalition with the Communists) to build socialism in France in 1981-1983.  This experience became an object of most intense attention in all discussions about the future of socialism.

A. NATTA. […] The French socialists say something we should take into account.  An attempt at democratic reforms in a country like France is very difficult, unless it is accompanied by similar attempts in other countries.  Just as the socialists began their reforms in France, the social democrats left the governments in West Germany and Great Britain.  This caused a lot of trouble.  Any progressive reform needs support from other progressive forces in Europe.

Indeed, trying to build socialism just in one, ‘separately taken’, country, one would face a very unpleasant choice.  If you keep building socialism you lose competitiveness.  If you take care of competitiveness, you have no socialism.  You cannot combine these two things, even armed cordons along the borders and other kinds of iron curtains do not help. The only solution is to impose socialism on your competitors as well.

The progressive solutions in the social sphere must fit in the European framework, Natta said. In one country, even the most interesting solutions would give only partial results.

But the Common Market, with its elimination of the trade barriers, would only worsen the situation, unless the communists took care of it urgently.

A. OKKETTO. […] Now, for the first time, we are talking about the European way to socialism. […] The idea of European way to socialism comes from an objective fact: the upcoming creation of a European single market in 1992. This problem deserves a serious analysis. We can assume that, after the 1992, no European state will be able to carry out a reform alone, on its own. Suppose some state […] creates more beneficial conditions for the toiling masses, and more difficult ones – for some groups of the Capital. Then we have every reason to expect that the capitals will flow away from that country. Hence is the objective necessity to co-ordinate our activities at the continental level.

The new attitude of the Left to European integration was pre-determined by this very consideration.  This attitude used to be cold, if not worse, for many decades, but now they realised that integration was about the only way to salvation.  Many years of their struggle for power in independent European countries proved fruitless.  The only thing left to do was to try to seize control over the whole of Europe at once.

A. NATTA. […] We have to recognise that the creation of a Single Market is not just a project, but a reality of Europe's development.  That is why the workers' movement of Western Europe, represented by its political parties and trade unions, should not ignore this process, but rather get involved in it actively.  What does await us in the future?  Decrease of unemployment or decrease of employment, alleviation or aggravation of economic problems, increase or decrease of influence of the major financial and industrial forces?  Of course, we would be displeased if domination by tycoons like Agnelli would emerge in an united Europe.  Let's hope that democracy will prevail, democracy in a sense of widening the social rights of the citizens, increasing  their political rights, such as a right to truthful information.

Of course, by ‘truthful information’ the communists meant their own propaganda. But what do they call democracy?

As Soviet and Italian communists agreed in their long discussions, the true democracy always meant socialism. As Akkille Okketto, Natta's successor as the ICP general secretary, put it to Gorbachev in 1989,

democracy is not the way to socialism, but the way of socialism. We believe there are no other ways to socialism.

This is wonderful and beautiful, Gorbachev replied.

These verbal tricks caused them serious communication problems: they had to invent some special terms to distinguish the socialist "democracy" from democracy, and also the old-style "people's democracy" from the new-style "democracy as the way of socialism".

M. S. GORBACHEV. You have mentioned the phrase "process of integral democracy". This is very interesting formula. This may be a basis for a serious discussion at a party congress.

I remember, when I studied at a department of philosophy, the professor told us at the first lecture: one who wants to study philosophy must learn to walk on a razor-edge. This is absolutely true both for us and for you. We must not slip off. We are planning a great turn, which requires huge intellectual efforts, even from the party's base. There might be accusations, like those which were used against Lenin when he introduced the New Economic Policy. He was accused of revisionism, or opportunism. Some people may accuse you of abandoning the socialist ideas.

One needs a great degree of imagination to dissern the socialist goal. But we cannot over-simplify things [in order to look more socialist]. They already accuse us of revisionism.

A. OKKETTO. We are all in the same boat.

Indeed, being in the same boat was a much clearer motivation than the misty socialist ideals. After all the atrocities the communists had committed for their dream, they had no way back. They had to preserve their power by every means, be it hook, crook, or process of integral democracy.

But what about the Socialism, once the all-powerful idol, now perverted and twisted by its cunning priests? Alas! By that time, none of them could even define what “socialism” should mean now. Each more or less sincere interpretation or model had already been experimentally tested somewhere, and none worked. Little hope to build the notorious Heaven on Earth had survived. The only thing they could do now was to keep fooling the public with more and more complicated chimeras.

Of course, some socialist terms remained - if nothing else, as the passwords, or Masonic-style signs, by which the conspirators could recognise each other. Moreover, even some socialist policies remained on the table - abandoning all of them would not only be hypocritical, but also look hypocritical, which was much worse. Yet, the communists had to make more and more concessions, to find a new dialectical compromise with the reality.

A. NATTA. […] We have already mentioned that the left-wing forces have, to some extent, lost their positions in the countries of Western Europe.  One of the causes of this is a certain tardiness in the analysis and perception of the processes of great changes under way in the contemporary capitalist society.  And not only the communists are late with this, but also the socialists and social democrats.  Absolutely insufficient was our analysis, our critical approach to the problems of contemporary capitalism, including the great changes which took place and continue in the sphere of production, in the social structure of the society.  In particular, we took too defensive a stance on such issues as the internationalisation of the capitalist economy, development and the crisis of the ‘welfare state’ and so on. 

We must recognise that, for example, the ‘welfare state’ brought great achievements to the working people – the sphere of services, pensions, social security.  But at the same time we, the communists, having either overestimated or underestimated the functions of the ‘welfare state’, kept defending situations which, as it became clear only now, we should not have defended.  As a result, a bureaucratic apparatus, which serves itself, has swelled.  It is interesting that a certain similarity with your situation, which you call stagnation, can be seen here.

M. S. Gorbachev. The ‘Parkinson's law’ works everywhere ...

A. Natta. Any bureaucratisation encourages the apparatus to protect its own interests and to forget about the citizens' interests.  I suppose, that is exactly why the Right's demands of re-privatisation are falling on a fertile ground in Western public opinion.

Indeed, the decades of ‘welfare state’ devastated the European economy no less than a military invasion would do.  But its architects were not honest enough to recognise they had made basic mistakes in their calculations.  They preferred to move to opposition, gloomily leaving the others to clean out the debris of this beautiful construction and lament the ensuing "infringements on the working people's interests". Nevertheless, the picture was clear even to them. The experiment of the century had failed. Now they had to retreat, reshuffle the forces and try again. As Gorbachev said,

let the conservatives take responsibility for the re-organisation of the economy.  The communists ought to bring forward more topical slogans.

Indeed, it is more important to keep power for a longer time than to take it quickly.  So, the Left decided to step back, uniting and amassing the forces.  They did not have to wait for too long.

In 1992 the creation of the European Single Market is planned, Natta remembered.  This will mean erosion of all the national frontiers: geographic, fiscal, economic.  This will lead to the creation of a single European currency, European central bank.  This process will be complex and will inevitably cause collisions of different opinions.  The Left has a chance for success.

However, a chance of success was not too much for the communists, used to seeing themselves as embodiments of historic inevitability. They had to find way to turn the chance into a reliable strategy, and the strategy into an invincible system.

M. S. GORBACHEV. It is true that we should approach these phenomena from realistic positions. But an interesting question is: how can we fight for the socialist alternative in the conditions of the EEC?

A. NATTA. We assume that the European community is a really existing organisation, i. e. a kind of battlefield on which the leftist forces have to wage their political struggle.

As usual, their political struggle was supposed to reflect the class struggle. Therefore, it had to be based on a profound class analysis:

A. NATTA. […] As for united Western Europe, so far conservative and liberal forces still dominate.  The leftist forces currently fall behind.  Because, first, they failed to gain the support of a wider strata of the population.  And, second, they failed to get closer to the centrist forces, representing the interests of new social strata, employed, for example, in the services sphere or in administration.  These strata are unreservedly in favour of integration.

Of course, this gap is not fatal yet, as we are willing and able to represent the interests of these new strata.  But there is a real possibility that they remain under the influence of the centrist or, at best, social democratic forces.  The new social strata exists and develops independently from our reckonings and forecasts, and we have to work with them.

Therefore, one thing was clear enough. It was necessary to unite all the left: communists, social democrats and anyone else who would support the socialist agenda. After all, there were many other political forces, apart from the communists, who had tained themselves with socialist experiments. So, they had every reason to end up "in the same boat".

A. NATTA. […] We need new efforts to widen the alliances, not only in Italy, but also in the European framework.  And I mean all the leftist forces in a wide sense of this word.  Not only communist, socialist and social democratic parties should be involved in these alliances, but also the whole complex of movements, of progressive forces with various aspirations, including the religious movements.  In the peace struggle the religious forces outstrip the communists somewhere, in organisation if not in ideas.  For example, in the Netherlands.  In Italy the situation is variable as well: there are some bishops carrying reactionary policies and there are some who are in favour of social justice, of equality.

However, in making these alliances we must preserve the communist identity of the party.  The communist identity is a living process, not determined once and forever.  I would like to repeat myself: the conditions have become complex, the processes are developing, and their laws are not established once and forever.  I can see that you are thinking about this as well.  Any transition from one phase of development to another always causes complex problems.  They are not fatal problems, pre-determined once and forever.  These are new opportunities.

However, Gorbachev warned the Italian comrade they should not go too far. All their manoeuvres,  smart as they might be, were to benefit the main goal: socialism.

One thought, he said.  In assessing your work, it is important always to keep in mind the attraction of the socialist ideal, of the socialist perspectives.  No one except us would think about it.  Others have other ideals, even the social democrats, let alone conservatives.  You are right, we have no prepared position on the left front, while our task is to enrich the left movement, to get new allies.  Perhaps, some intermediate stages will appear on the way.  We should go through them, not losing sight of our goals.  Some have got lost seeking answers to the questions raised.  It is possible to lose all the positions as a result.  [...]  We should seek points of interface, temporary alliances are possible as well.  But the true alternative to the bourgeois parties are the communists.

A. NATTA. We still do not have majority in Europe on our side. Neither we, nor the social democrats. Nor even together. The battle for the people's minds is going on.

Of course, this strategy meant inevitable and significant compromises, but that was acceptable.  The communist dogma allows them in an extreme situation.  All the more so, as this retreat from Marxist orthodoxy was forced on the Left not only by political needs, but also, and even to a greater extent, by the economic crisis of socialism.  This crisis urged them to moderate their agenda anyway, introducing some elements of free market into the socialist model.  But they found it to be a good idea to pretend this was a huge concession not to the reality, but to their political allies.

M. S. GORBACHEV. What shall be the socio-economic nature of this society?

A. OCCETTO. We can say that this society shall develop on the basis of constant changes […]. In any case, we believe that quite a long stage of development shall be that of a mixed economy. […]

M. S. GORBACHEV. […] What kind of society shall this be? Probably, this shall be the movement from one stage to another, via democracy to socialism. In other words, there should be more democracy in economy, in political and social institutions. But this movement shall have the form of a process rather than a one-time act.

A. OKKETTO. Precisely. That is the whole point.

M. S. GORBACHEV. But shall the communist party melt down? Shall it abandon its nature? Shall it become social-democratic? No. I understand that the ICP is going to save its face, but to keep changing it.

However, the split of the workers' movement shall be overcome. Apparently, this is going to be a union of various forces representing various trends in the workers' movement. Of such forces to whom the idea of socialism is close. […] The goal is still the same: socialism. But different stages emerge, and apparently, allies might be changed at some stages. Not everyone will agree to ally with you right now. […]

It is time to pass from the concept to concrete politics, to specific agenda. Tactics shall have great significance at this stage. I do not rule out involving certain strata of bourgeoisie. We should learn from life. Life should be our teacher.

3. So much for Euro-communism

It would be difficult to overstate how well the Italian fresh ideas matched the Soviet interests and plans. "European way to socialism" was exactly "good aspect of the integration" which Gorbachev so much wanted to find - or create. The need to ally with social democrats was one of the main reasons why the Kremlin had started its "perestroika". A reform of wasteful socialist system was even more necessary in the East than in the West. And above all, European integration on socialist terms provided great opportunities to "oust the Americans out of the continent", thus snatching victory in the Cold War from the jaws  of defeat.

In fact, the idea to use European integration for the Cold War purposes was not entirely new to the Soviets. As early as in 1984 Vadim Zagladin of the CPSU International Department reported about his talks with Egon Bahr, number two in the Social Democratic Party of Germany, and a secret collaborator of Moscow.

In Western Europe, Bahr said, the idea to separate ourselves from the American policies is becoming ever more popular. We want to secure ourselves from the adventurism of the US administration to some extent. But this is possible only if Europe has its own system of defence. This system may even exist in the NATO framework, but under European, not American, command, and with European, not American, strategy.

[…]

The USSR must understand, Bahr continued, that such Europe would not threaten the Soviet Union, and would not even be able to. It would not be dangerous for the Soviet Union. It would be unwilling and unable to attack the Soviet Union, but it would get certain independence from the United States.

Therefore, what we need is to remove all the American nuclear weapons from Europe. […]

A creation of suchlike defence system on the basis of European union would be, in Bahr's opinion, an absolutely new turning point in the continent's history. And then, in the long perspective, it would be possible to achieve reduction of the armament levels in Europe on both sides.

Obviously, Bahr said, the current West German government is unable to make a turn of this kind. This government is connected with the United States, and mostly pursues pro-American goals. Such a turn may happen only if an SDPG government comes to power.

[…]

The French government is also becoming more and more inclined to such a choice. France's decision to create its own satellites system which would provide operation of its missiles is, first of all, due to the desire to ensure France's independence from the NATO. Because today French nuclear weapons are completely dependant on the NATO system of missile guidance. Mitterrand is very displeased with that.

SDPG is constantly in touch with the French socialist party, discussing all these problems. Gradually, but ever more clearly, the leaders of that party are getting inclined to the European version of defence, in order to weaken Europe's dependence on the United States in the first place.

He, Bahr, would like to discuss these problems with the Soviet representatives, too. However, he underlined, he was not going to talk about that in presence of the other SDPG members who accompany him to the USSR – at least, not in great detail. These problems are discussed in the SDPG by a very narrow circle only.

On 6 July, 1988, Gorbachev made a secret speech to his Warsaw pact allies, to explain to them the true meaning of "Common European Home", and to instruct them on what their own modest roles were. Judging from this speech, ‘perestroika’ was intended to change the political situation in Western countries rather than in the USSR. It was

to allow socialism to get involved in shaping the world politics more actively and more widely, to influence it more effectively and to stimulate positive changes in the surrounding world.

First of all, the new image of socialism undermines  the traditional claims of the right-wing circles in the West for dominating influence, which used to be supported by the image of the enemy – socialist ‘totalitarian monster’.  Openly hostile to the socialism conservative front, which had strengthened in the West in the early '80s, began to erode.

In other words, it was to influence foreign politics by any means, bringing the most ''progressive'' forces there to power.

Being realists, [we] cannot wait for new partners, for a more democratic alternative to get into governments in the West.  But, in substance, we are enabling such an alternative.

The renewal of socialism is also an invitation to evolution of the capitalist world, an encouragement  for the forces able to overcome class prejudice and ready for co-operative work in the solution of contemporary burning problems to take centre-stage there.  And this can already be seen in the growth of influence of the bourgeoisie's moderate wing.

In communist ideology, by ‘bourgeoisie's moderate wing’ they usually meant socialists and social democrats. The Soviet ‘perestroika’ created a favourable political climate for them, cutting the ground from under the Right.  This policy combined very well with the Euro-communists' efforts to unite all the Left in a wide pro-Soviet alliance.

The said Euro-communists, on their part, perfectly understood what they were doing.

A. NATTA. To maintain relations with the Left in Europe is not an easy task. We can see this, for example, with our own socialists in Italy. If the left-wing forces want to be more independent, they must have more connections to the Soviet Union, they must carry out policy for development and socialism.

Therefore, it was important to make a pro-Soviet stance respectable first, and that was what Gorbachev's reforms were all about. 

Some say that Gorbachev almost abandoned any plans to "export socialism". Such a judgement shows complete misunderstanding of the very idea of export (not to mention the idea of socialism). If you make your product look better, and then go around the world advertising the improvements, - this does not mean you do not want to sell it anymore. Was not it obvious that everything Gorbachev did was intended to make that dubious product more exportable? He proved to be such a good sales manager that, even after his political downfall, his abilities were duly recognised and employed by Pizza Hutt.

Needless to say, if Gorbachev got involved in such a "capitalist" project as European integration, it was not because he recognised the errors of socialist ways. It merely meant that he wanted to hijack the project.

M. S. GORBACHEV. […] European Community is a result of the united efforts of different countries' capitalist centres. The Italian Communist Party […] understands the objective nature of the integration process. But it is obvious that capitalists and communists have different goals. As for the capitalists, their goals are clear. But what are the goals of the united Left in West Europe?

There is yet another thing. Not only conservatives, who are in power, co-operate at the political level in the EEC framework, but also the social democrats. And when you are considering a block of the Left, you want to involve the social democrats in it. A difficult situation may emerge here…

The hint was clear: how could disunited communists successfully compete with the united socialists or conservatives? So, greater unity was necessary - though everybody knows what Moscow always meant by communist unity. Yet, Natta could not object.

A. NATTA. […] I would like to link these problems with the wider approach to the international problems, with what you, comrade Gorbachev, call wholeness and interdependence of contemporary world. It seems to me that the problem of establishing relations between the COMECON and the EEC fits in this approach.

In connection with that I want to emphasise that the new situation in the world was created thanks to the Soviet Union policies' extraordinary success at the international stage. […] I do not want to make compliments to you, but I would like to express the Italian Communist Party's solidarity with today's policies of the CPSU.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Thank you for solidarity. We can feel it. In relations between the communists, solidarity is probably one of the most important factors for their successes. 

A. NATTA. I must tell you frankly that our solidarity with the CPSU is permanent. It is absolutely necessary to proceed with those proposals which the USSR brings forward about perestroika, including in the sphere of international relations, the sphere of detante and disarmament. Because they have extremely positive influence with the public opinion in the West, with the political climate in international relations, and with the formation of new ideas.

In June 1986, Giorgio Napolitano visited Moscow and had long discussions in the CPSU International Department. One of his Soviet collocutors, Vadim Zagladin, reported to his bosses about these talks in the following way:

During the conversation, G. Napolitano appeared to be a very calm and sober politician. The core of his considerations is the following:

First, Western Europe is going through a period of re-thinking now, whose essence is the growing discontent, and even indignation, with the US policies. Europe wants to provide sort of its independence from the USA within the NATO. […] The ICP leadership believes these feelings should be supported and strengthened.

Second, as the comrades believe, such feelings cannot produce any "political output" right now, because in many European countries – most importantly in West Germany and Great Britain – conservative forces are in power. Therefore, a real shift in European politics should mean two components: replacing the conservatives with leftists, or at least more liberal forces; the change of European [geopolitical] orientation, although keeping the allied relationship in the NATO until the both military blocks are dissolved.

Third, what determines the ICP policies is its "European choice". The comrades believe it is necessary now to try to unite all the European left-wing forces on the basis of peace, disarmament, and independence of European politics. ICP is going to play a very active role in this sense.

I asked G. Napolitano: whom do the friends include in the idea of "Left-wing forces of Europe"? He said that, of course, they mean all the left-wing forces […], but the most important thing is to ensure co-operation with social democrats. In some countries, they are in power and therefore able to act, and in the others, they may soon come to power and get the opportunity to act.

Com. G. Napolitano told me in details about his party's relations with social democrats. His story implies that the ICP mostly communicates to the Social Democratic Party of Germany. There are rather occasional contacts with the British Labourites, with Danish social democrats, with the [Greek] PASOK, and the Spanish socialist workers' party. There are also official contacts with the French socialist party which, as Napolitano said, produce no practical results.

In the past, certain difficulties for the development of these contacts were created by the Italian socialists, who practically "vetoed" any relations between ICP and the members of Socialist International. […]

Then I gave G. Napolitano a detailed information about the CPSU's links with the socialist, social democratic, and labour parties. He said he was very impressed,

and this was giving him some ideas about possible co-operation between ICP, CPSU and social-democrats in the future.

Perhaps, it was quite embarrassing for the ICP to learn that, after all their "Euro-communist" manoeuvres, the Soviets still had better connections among European social democrats. However, in view of the new plans such connections were becoming the most important assets. So, the Italians had to understand the implications.

Indeed they did. Needless to say, while talking so frankly with his dear comrade Napolitano, Zagladin also had ways to learn about the comrade's private reactions. The next day he met with G. Kiessa <spelling?>, the Unita correspondent in Moscow, and it emerged that

G. Napolitano said to a number of Italian comrades that the well-known phrase of Berlinguer about the "exhaustion of the October Revolution's impetus" is no more relevant now. G. Kiessa noted that he accepted this statement of G. Napolitano with satisfaction.

Indeed, if the "Euro-communism" had ever meant any degree of independence from Moscow, it had not paid off. From now on, the primary task of the communists was manipulation of social democrats; and, oddly enough, CPSU was the best in that. Therefore, the Italian communists had to forget about independence. In complete unity would they go for the great tasks which laid ahead.

4. Socialist donkey.

Needless to say, European socialists enthusiastically welcomed the new partnership.  This was their dream coming true.  Ever since the social democrats split at the beginning of 20th century into Bolsheviks (communists) and Mensheviks (socialists), the latter were hoping that one day the Bolsheviks will see the light, "mellow down" and return to the fold of Social Democracy.  And the former always shamelessly exploited this dream by pretending to see the Mensheviks' light each time they found themselves in a tough corner.  Hence followed all sorts of Popular Fronts, United Fronts, etc. which all invariably ended in yet another quarrel (as soon as the Bolsheviks were comfortably out of a current trouble).  Still, no matter how many times this scenario has repeated itself, the Menshevik's donkey was always happy to be once again seduced by the Bolshevik's carrot.  What else could they do?  After all, the difference between them was mostly in questions of tactics, their ultimate goal and, to some extent, their ideology was the same.

So it happened again, with the launching of Gorbachev's perestroika which was perceived by the European socialists as a great historic opportunity.

Spanish socialists:

…The success of perestroika means only one thing – the success of the socialist revolution in contemporary conditions.  And that is exactly what the reactionaries don't accept, – said Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, Spanish Foreign Minister, to Gorbachev in Moscow, on 3^rd March, 1989.  The Soviet leader appreciated such a deep understanding of his idea, so he replied:

Now, addressing you as a socialist, I ask you to tell F. Gonzalez that all of us should bear in mind one principal point.  Today we, the communists, are working to realise the potentials of socialism as fully as possible, through perestroika.  This is our model of socialist society.  But I am sure that the success of our search would enrich the socialist values, which are common for all of us.  All of us would be able to move forward significantly faster.  I suppose, the Socialist International should be interested in that no less than ourselves.  Eventually, we will manage to sort out which model of society is best to meet the yearnings of working people, their hopes for justice.  This is something you and we surely can sort out.

F. Fernandez Ordonez. What you are talking about is exceptionally important.  In the process of perestroika the main bet is the outcome of the ideological battle.  The success of the ideas of socialism in the contemporary world community depends on the success of perestroika.

M. S. Gorbachev. Through our perestroika, through the new ideas brought forward by the socialists of Western Europe, we are not moving away from each other, we are doing the opposite.  From our point of view, now, at the critical stage of the development of human history, there are no reasons why the two factions of the workers' movement should be positioned on different sides of the barricades once again.  No, mutual understanding and solidarity, adequate to present realities, should dominate the relations between the two factions of the workers' movement.  We are feeling real comradely interest, sympathy and understanding of our problems and difficulties, understanding of the importance of our course by those countries, where socialist or social democratic governments are in power.

A year and a half later, on 26^th October, 1990, Felipe Gonzalez himself would tell Gorbachev in Madrid his complex theory of modern socialism.

The Revolution of 1917, he said, began the split of the world into two antagonistic systems. The emergence of these two alternative models actually opened a way to attempts of creating a third model – social democracy, Nazism, fascism. Today the essence of the revolution, going on in the world, is the movement to the united world community.

I must say that confusing ideological and political analyses as we did for many years – and, to some extent, all of us are responsible for that – made a fetish of the opposition between capitalism and socialism. For many years, to great extent artificially, we supported that antagonism.

Today I come to one quite strange conclusion. Since we came to power, I had to struggle with my party comrades to make them understand that the market economy is the best instrument to achieve our main goals.  Just the best instrument, but not the goal in itself.  I feel intellectual disgust when I have to read, for example, passages in the documents of ‘G7’ where the problems of democracy, freedom of human personality and ideology of market economy are set on the same level.  As a socialist, I cannot accept such an equation.

French socialists:

Long before all the troubles, back in 1981, life still seemed beautiful to President Mitterrand. He had just became President and began to introduce socialism in France.

You have two gods, he told President Reagan. You are a believer. Hence, you have already got one god. And your second god is capitalism. Your soul's god is called Christ. Your second god, capitalism, is called market. But, in my view, the god in whom you really believe is market.

After such a jeer on Reagan's religious feelings, Mitterrand went on with building socialism in France. Quite predictably, the whole construction collapsed in a couple of years. However, this neither converted French president to Christ, nor to market. And even eight years later, when the socialism got bankrupt on global scale as well, Mitterrand would recall his past conversation with Reagan with great pleasure.

That is a deeply rooted ideology for the Americans, he generalized. And here, in Europe, many do not share this American ideology. We allow market, but as a fact rather than a deity. And we are trying to correct it. Market is effective, but unjust. We should combine advantages of the market with the social justice. We do not want the forces dominant in the Western world to constantly oppress the same strata. Market without any control is a kind of feudalism. And that is exactly the kind of market which the American doctrine means. We are friends of the USA. Our systems have much in common. But you should not identify them with each other. USA and Europe are different societies.

Needless to say, Mitterand meant just ideological differences here, not economic ones. Both Gorbachev and he knew perfectly well about the state's regulating role in American economy. They would even emphasize this fact, resenting that the Americans were always talking about market economy without actually living in it. So, the problem was not in economy at all.

Yes, the Americans did not live is a market economy, but they believed in market. They had two gods. They were heretics, and that is why there was no place for them in new Europe. Single Europe must have single god. There is no god but Socialism, and Mitterrand is his Prophet.

The construction of a ‘Common European Home’ is a great idea, he proclaimed to Gorbachev.  Anyone who has imagination and intellectual courage, would easily imagine the European continent, all of  the countries situated there, as a new entity, connected by relations of a new kind, in the framework of which everyone remains oneself and all of them co-operate in the name of coinciding goals.  I, personally, consider the realisation of this idea as my top priority.

We can only wonder how could Mitterrand guess that a ‘Common European Home’ was something pretty close to his own pan-European ideas.

Europe, united in the EEC framework is just the first step to the true goal, to achieve which we will need very much time – twenty five, fifty years or, perhaps, even the whole century.  The true goal is the whole of Europe.

But some aspects of the bright future, concealed behind the monumental facade of the ‘Common European Home’, were omitted in their public pronouncements.  For instance, the common European structures were supposed to be based not only on the European Communities, but also on the economic organisation of the Warsaw Pact – the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.  That is why one of Mitterrand's top priorities was the development of connections between the EC and COMECON.

Since the Soviet Union was the strongest member of the COMECON, it was supposed to become at least one of the landlords of the ‘Common European Home’.  Naturally, this would mean either socialist ‘home’, or no ‘home’ at all.

But Mitterrand was not afraid of that either.  He was a socialist, and nothing socialist was alien to him.  For the Soviet Union was promising to attach something like a ‘human face’ to its socialism.  If so, why should not the West add a bit of socialism to its ‘human face’?

It seems to me, Mitterrand discoursed, that as far as individual rights are concerned, the practice existing in Western countries seems more perfect than the respective practice in the Soviet Union.  At the same time, as far as collective rights are concerned, especially in industrially developed countries, the West as a whole will probably have to work a lot in this direction.  I mean right to work and so on.

And other social rights, Gorbachev happily provided the term from the Soviet jargon.

F. Mitterrand. In France, by the way, there are a lot of areas where the problem of social rights reflects the inequality between various strata of French society.

So, Mitterrand clarified his intention to solve this ‘problem of social rights’ in France and in Europe as a whole.  This probably meant the elimination of social inequality, of which the ‘problem’ was only a reflection.  Meanwhile, the East would complete their ‘perestroika’ and little difference would remain between the two socialist empires.  They would be ready to converge.